




Being in the Language of Poetry, 
Being in the Language of Law 
ABSTRACT 
eing in the Language of Poetry, Being in the Language of Law 
was originally presented as the 2008–2009 Colin Ruagh Thomas 
O’Fallon Memorial Lecture at the University of Oregon School of 
Law, on April 16, 2009.  The O’Fallon Memorial Lecture, which is 
sponsored by the Oregon Humanities Center, alternates each year 
between lectures on law and art in American culture.  Professor 
Lawrence Joseph is the first lecturer in this series to combine both law 
and art as the subjects of his presentation.  Professor Joseph brings a 
unique perspective to his topics.  An eminent legal scholar, and 
former practicing lawyer and judicial law clerk, he is also the award-
winning author of five widely acclaimed books of poetry; of 
Lawyerland, a book of creative prose; and of literary essays and other 
works of creative prose.  Being in the Language of Poetry, Being in 
the Language of Law is a personal essay adapted from Professor 
Joseph’s lecture.  In it, he takes his reader through his various 
experiences with the languages of both his vocations and details how 
these languages overlap and affect him.  The style and composition of 
the Essay create the sense of both living in and being intensely 
involved in languages both legal and literary.  The ultimate effect is, 
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through the portrayal of the languages of law and poetry, a portrait of 
language itself. 
I 
The 1985 Tanner Lecture on Human Values at the University of 
Michigan was delivered on November 8 of that year by Clifford 
Geertz.  Geertz’s lecture, The Uses of Diversity, was published in the 
Winter 1986 issue of the Michigan Quarterly Review.  “[M]eaning,” 
Geertz said, “comes to exist only within language games, 
communities of discourse, intersubjective systems of reference, ways 
of worldmaking.”1  Meaning is “through and through historical, 
hammered out in the flow of events.”  “The limits of my language are 
the limits of my world,” Geertz added, invoking Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.2  “[T]he reach of our 
minds, the range of signs we can manage somehow to interpret, is 
what defines the intellectual, emotional and moral space within which 
we live.”3 
The Spring 1986 Michigan Quarterly Review is devoted to—in the 
words of its editor Laurence Goldstein—“Michigan’s premier city,” 
Detroit.  Detroit: An American City includes a selection of journal 
entries of mine, titled “Our Lives Are Here”: Notes from a Journal, 
Detroit, 1975.  For the first entry, January 8,4 I wrote that it is 
“our”—my and Nancy’s—“second week in the Alden Park.”  I had 
just moved from Ann Arbor to Detroit.  I will “commute to Ann 
Arbor for law school, four times a week.”  The Alden Park is a 1920s 
Tudor-style apartment building on Detroit’s east side beside the 
Detroit River.  Next to it is Solidarity House, the international 
headquarters of the United Automobile Workers.  On January 15, 
1975, I wrote: “‘No hopeful signs for the economy.’  Detroit is 
hurting, badly; ‘as Detroit goes so goes the nation.’  More and more 
empty houses and stores, For Lease and For Sale signs.  ‘As long as 
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits pay holds out’—but then 
what?”5  On November 13: 
 
1 Clifford Geertz, The Uses of Diversity, 25 MICH. Q. REV. 105, 112–13 (1986). 
2 Id. at 113; see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 149 
(C.K. Ogden ed. & trans., Routledge 2005) (1922). 
3 Geertz, supra note 1, at 113. 
4 Lawrence Joseph, “Our Lives Are Here”: Notes from a Journal, Detroit, 1975, 25 
MICH Q. REV. 296, 296 (1986). 
5 Id. 
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 Yesterday: bone-chilling, damp coldness that the landscape 
seemed to equal: the singular smokestack near Eastern Market; St. 
Josephat’s towers seen from the Chrysler freeway . . . the burned 
out warehouse in old Poletown surrounded by acres of weeds . . . . 
 How much has been lost, how much hidden and buried and 
forgotten.  How much fear absorbs the capacity to see and accept.6 
On December 12—as I studied for final exams for my final 
semester in law school—I wrote: 
 Friday night, late.  Just finished outlining the “enterprise 
organizations” course. . . . Now to review three or four chapters of 
secured transactions.  “Floating liens”—how a lender protects itself 
. . . and other intrigues . . . . 
 . . . A cold, snowy night.  Papers, books all over the place.  Can 
hear the wind outside howling over the river.  Every once and 
awhile I look to see if it’s still snowing . . . . I think: what if I took 
the time to work on poetry that I take to study law—but, no, of 
course, the intensity required to write poems must be differently 
directed . . . .7 
On November 12, 1975, Justice William O. Douglas resigned from 
the United States Supreme Court because of illness.  Justice Douglas 
had been on the Court since April of 1939—over thirty-six years, the 
longest-serving Justice in the Court’s history.  I was reminded of this 
while I was rereading Professor James O’Fallon’s Nature’s Justice: 
Writings of William O. Douglas,8 a book of Justice Douglas’s selected 
writings interspersed with O’Fallon’s commentary.  One opinion 
presented in its entirety in Nature’s Justice is Justice Douglas’s 
dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.9  The Sierra Club brought suit for a 
declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the U.S. Forest 
Service from approving an extensive skiing development proposed by 
Walt Disney Enterprises in the Mineral King Valley in the southern 
part of the Sequoia National Forest.10  The issue was whether the 
Sierra Club had standing under section 10 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act11 to seek judicial review of the government’s 
 
6 Id. at 301. 
7 Id. at 301–02. 
8 NATURE’S JUSTICE: WRITINGS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (James O’Fallon ed., 2000). 
9 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
10 Justice Stewart, in the Court’s four-Justice majority opinion, described the Sequoia 
National Forest as “an area of great natural beauty nestled in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains.”  Id. at 728. 
11 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, 
is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
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decision.12  The majority opinion held that the Sierra Club lacked 
standing to maintain the action because it suffered no individualized 
harm to itself or its members.  Justice Douglas dissented.  He wrote: 
 The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also 
put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed 
environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or 
federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be 
despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where 
injury is the subject of public outrage.13 
Justice Douglas states further that environmental issues “should be 
tendered by the inanimate object itself.”14  “[V]alleys, alpine 
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, 
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern 
technology and modern life” should be “parties in litigation,” to 
assure that “all of the forms of life . . . will stand before the court—
the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings 
as well as the trout in the streams.”15  “That, as I see it”—Douglas 
concludes—“is the issue of ‘standing’ in the present case and 
controversy.”16 
I first read Sierra Club v. Morton during the summer of 1974 in an 
administrative law course taught by Professor Joseph Vining.  
Professor Vining spent an entire class on the case, taking us through 
its various factual and technical dimensions and especially, with 
favor, Justice Douglas’s and Justice Blackmun’s dissents.  Professor 
Vining specifically pointed out the language at the conclusion of 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent, a reference to a “particularly pertinent 
observation and warning of John Donne,” which, Professor Vining 
added, Blackmun quoted in a footnote: 
“No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe; every man is a peece of the 
Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the 
Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as 
if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any man’s death 
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore 
never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”  
Devotions XVII.17 
 
12 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 731–34. 
13 Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
14 Id. at 752. 
15 Id. at 752. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 760 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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When Sierra Club v. Morton was decided on April 19, 1972, I was 
in the second of two years of postgraduate study at the University of 
Cambridge, studying English Language and Literature.  I had decided 
by then to return to Ann Arbor, where I had been an undergraduate, to 
study law.  In a journal entry dated April 18, 1972, I note: “Poems—
three general categories: (1) threnodies (justice; Jeremiah) . . . (2) 
psalms (beauty; Augustine) . . . (3) ‘conversations’ (morality; 
Camus).” 
Another standing case with a dissent written by Justice Douglas 
was decided two months after Sierra Club, on June 26, 1972.  Laird v. 
Tatum involved covert surveillance by Army Intelligence of antiwar 
and civil rights groups.  In early June of 1972, I took my 
examinations at Cambridge for Part II of the English Tripos and then 
spent most of the rest of that year in France reading, mostly Albert 
Camus, Simone Weil, and Rene Char, and writing, often extensively, 
in my journal.  I returned to Detroit in December.  During the winter 
and spring of 1973, I worked at Chrysler’s Lynch Road Assembly and 
Clairpointe plants in Detroit.  In May, I moved to Ann Arbor and 
began law school—in Michigan Law School parlance, a “summer 
starter.”  I don’t recall reading Laird v. Tatum during law school; I 
came upon the case in late 1990 during the buildup to the first Gulf 
War, when I looked at a series of Justice Douglas’s opinions dealing 
with the President’s war-making powers.  Since then, I have taught 
Laird every year in a law and interpretation seminar course. 
Detroit figures substantively in Laird.  Section 331 of Title 10 of 
the United States Code establishes the statutory conditions for the 
President to follow in order to call the armed forces into action 
“[w]henever there is an insurrection in any State against its 
government.”  Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion in Laird for a five-
member majority, wrote that “[p]ursuant to those provisions, 
President Johnson ordered federal troops to assist local authorities at 
the time of the civil disorders in Detroit, Michigan, in the summer of 
1967 and during the disturbances that followed the assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King.”18  Chief Justice Burger continued: “Prior to 
the Detroit disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for 
providing such assistance to local authorities, but the 1967 experience 
led Army authorities to believe that more attention should be given to 
such preparatory planning.”19  The Army’s covert data-gathering 
 
18 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1972). 
19 Id. at 5. 
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system—which came to light in an article in the January 1970 issue of 
the Washington Monthly—“is said” (Chief Justice Burger continued in 
the passive voice) “to have been established in connection with the 
development of more detailed and specific contingency planning 
designed to permit the Army, when called upon to assist local 
authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a minimum of 
force.”20  Respondents in Laird (specifically identified only in Justice 
Douglas’s dissenting opinion)—persons and groups of persons for 
whom, allegedly, the Army maintained files on their ideology, 
programs, memberships, and practices—included “virtually every 
activist political group in the country, including groups such as the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laymen 
United Against the War in Vietnam, the American Civil Liberties 
Union, Women’s Strike for Peace, and the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People.”21 
The majority in Laird held that the mere existence of the Army’s 
data-gathering system did not chill the respondents’ First Amendment 
rights because there was no showing on the record of any objective 
harm or threat of specific future harm; respondents, therefore, failed 
to establish a justiciable controversy and lacked standing.22  In his 
dissent, Justice Douglas first denounced the majority’s implicit 
conclusion that the President has the authority to establish 
surveillance over the civilian population.23  Justice Douglas declared: 
 If Congress had passed a law authorizing the armed services to 
establish surveillance over the civilian population, a most serious 
constitutional problem would be presented.  There is, however, no 
law authorizing surveillance over civilians, which in this case the 
Pentagon concededly had undertaken.  The question is whether such 
authority may be implied.  One can search the Constitution in vain 
for any such authority.24 
As for “[t]he claim that respondents have no standing to challenge 
the Army’s surveillance of them and the other members of the class 
they seek to represent,” Justice Douglas responds that it “is too 
transparent for serious argument.”25  “To withhold standing to sue . . . 
would in practical effect immunize from judicial scrutiny all 
 
20 Id. at 5. 
21 Id. at 24–25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
22 See id. at 13–14 (majority opinion). 
23 See id. at 16, 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 16. 
25 Id. at 24. 
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surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse and their deterrent 
effect.”26 
In May of 1976, I began a two-year clerkship with Justice G. 
Mennen Williams, who was, at that point in his public career, a sixth-
year associate justice of the Michigan Supreme Court.  Williams, a 
Democrat, had served as Governor of Michigan for six two-year 
terms from 1948 until 1960.  In 1961, President Kennedy named him 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.  In 1968, he was 
named Ambassador to the Philippines.  Williams was elected to the 
Michigan Supreme Court in 1970 and reelected in 1978.  In 1983, he 
was named chief justice.  He left the court on January 1, 1987, and 
then taught at the University of Detroit School of Law.  He died the 
following year.27 
The September 15, 1952, issue of Time magazine features Williams 
on its cover.28  At an “undaunted” forty-one years old, the anonymous 
writer for Time wrote, Williams was running for his third two-year 
term as governor in a traditionally Republican state.  Describing 
Williams’s early career, the Time writer noted that in 1937—shortly 
after Williams graduated from the University of Michigan Law 
School—“Michigan’s redheaded Governor Frank Murphy” (also a 
Michigan Law School graduate) “summoned [Williams] to Lansing to 
be assistant state attorney general.”  When, in 1939, Franklin 
Roosevelt named Murphy Attorney General of the United States, 
Murphy made Williams his executive assistant.  After Williams 
served in the Navy as a lieutenant commander with ten Pacific battle 
stars and a Legion of Merit, he was discharged in 1946, and Murphy, 
then in his sixth year as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, helped get Williams appointed Deputy Director of the Office 
of Price Administration in Michigan.  When this position expired, 
Williams was named a member of the Michigan State Liquor 
Commission.  Running for Governor in 1948, Williams allied himself 
with the CIO’s Political Action Committee, which was anchored by 
some four hundred thousand members of Walter Reuther’s United 
Auto Workers in and around Detroit. 
In 1988, I was asked, with others, to write a tribute to Williams for 
the University of Detroit Law Review.  Between the time that I 
 
26 Id. at 26. 
27 See Lawrence Joseph, Justice G. Mennen Williams: A Memoir, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 
339, 339–42 (1989); see also Stephen D. Conley, G. Mennen Williams—Michigan’s 
Lawyer Public Servant, 79 MICH. B.J. 1398, 1398–99 (2000). 
28 Michigan: Prodigy’s Prospects, TIME, Sept. 15, 1952. 
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completed my clerkship with Williams in 1978 and when Nancy and I 
moved to New York City in 1981, I taught for three years on the 
faculty of the University of Detroit School of Law.  By 1988, I had 
returned to full-time law teaching at St. John’s University School of 
Law in New York City.  In Justice G. Mennen Williams: A Memoir, I 
wrote that Williams considered himself “politically as an heir to the 
progressive traditions of his mentors Frank Murphy and Franklin 
Roosevelt; like them, he saw himself as a ‘fighter for progress.’”29  I 
noted: 
A portrait of Williams—painted when he was governor—hung in 
his supreme court offices on the fourteenth floor of the Lafayette 
Building in downtown Detroit.  Williams was portrayed in the 
center; above him, on one side, was an image of Franklin 
Roosevelt; above him, on the other side, an image of Frank 
Murphy.30 
Speaking of Williams’s accomplishments during his twenty-eight 
years both as Governor of Michigan and as associate and chief justice 
of the Michigan Supreme Court, I noted that he 
fervently espoused an active government role in the protection of 
the state’s wealth of land, air, and water resources.  He publicly 
applauded Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (authored by 
University of Michigan Law School Professor Joseph Sax) for its 
unparalleled, far-reaching substantive provisions and its 
unprecedented provisions permitting individuals, as “private state 
attorneys general,” to seek protective remedial action on the 
public’s behalf.  He endorsed the Act’s expressed recognition of the 
public trust doctrine: he firmly believed that the state holds its 
natural resources in trust for the people.31 
I wrote that Williams “was enormously proud of his opinion, Ray v. 
Mason County Drain Commissioner, which vigorously upheld the 
Sax Act’s constitutionality.”32 
My clerkship with Williams began with the assignment to draft two 
labor and employment law majority opinions, Breish v. Ring Screw 
Works and Bingham v. American Screw Products Co.  Williams 
would discuss with his clerks the direction that he wished a draft of an 
opinion to take and then give great leeway in the drafting process.  If 
 
29 Joseph, supra note 27, at 340. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 342–43 (footnote omitted). 
32 Id. at 343 (footnote omitted); see also Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701 (West 1999); Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm’r, 
224 N.W.2d 883, 895 (Mich. 1975). 
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he was pleased with a clerk’s draft, he would sometimes adopt it as 
his own almost verbatim. 
Breish was decided on November 23, 1976.  In Breish, the 
plaintiff-appellant 
was discharged from his employment by Defendant-Appellee Ring 
Screw Works on June 1, 1971 for alleged theft of company 
property, a small can of cleaner valued at less than one dollar . . . .  
Ring Screw Works discharged Breish for what it considered ‘just 
cause,’ pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement in effect at 
that time between Ring Screw Works and UAW Local 771.33 
Williams’s majority opinion opens: 
 This case involves a suit by a discharged employee against his 
former employer for breach of a collective bargaining contract.  The 
employee exhausted the contractual grievance procedure.  At each 
applicable step of the procedure, the employer denied the 
employee’s grievance.  Under the terms of the collective bargaining 
contract, the ‘final’ decision on the merits of the employee’s 
grievance was, effectively, recourse to a strike by his union.  The 
union voted not to strike over his complaint.34 
The issue, Williams states, is narrow: the court is “asked to decide 
whether the strike vote of plaintiff’s union, effectively the 
culminating step under the contractual grievance procedure, is 
plaintiff’s sole and exclusive mode of legal redress, thus barring him 
from maintaining a breach-of-contract suit against defendant.”35  
Although the case “might appear to be . . . simple . . . on the surface, 
its resolution brings into play a broad spectrum of complex federal 
labor relations law.”36  “Because plaintiff’s suit [was] for breach of 
the collective bargaining contract, the suit arises under § 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act and is controlled by federal law, 
even though it has been brought in state court.”37  An “essential 
reason” for the case’s complexity under federal labor law was the fact 
that “the contract grievance procedure at issue is quite uncommon in 
the context of labor relations law.  According to one reputable 
estimate, ninety-six percent of the collective bargaining contracts in 
the United States include comprehensive contract grievance 
 
33 Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 248 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Mich. 1976). 
34 Id. at 526–27. 
35 Id. at 529. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 529 n.4. 
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procedures culminating in final and binding arbitration.”38  “[M]ost 
legal questions,” Williams writes, 
pertaining to the ‘finality’ of a culminating step of a grievance 
procedure therefore revolve around the ‘finality’ of arbitration 
decisions.  Thus in the instant case we must interpret federal law [as 
it applies to] a relatively unique issue, an issue which, we note, has 
never been directly decided by the United States Supreme Court.39 
The court’s holding is stated in the second paragraph of Williams’s 
opinion. 
 The federal labor law on this question mandates that judicial 
review of a ‘final’ decision on the merits of an aggrieved 
employee’s complaint is barred unless the final step of the 
grievance procedure is inadequate to provide a procedurally fair 
decision.  In this case, the ‘final’ determination of the merits of the 
discharged employee’s complaint was the strike vote by his fellow 
union members.  The effect of this procedure is that the decision of 
whether an employee should be discharged from his employment is 
dependent on whether those adjudging the merits of his claim 
choose to imperil their own economic status; those desiring to rule 
in favor of the discharged employee would pay the price of giving 
up their own jobs. . . . [S]uch a ‘final’ merits determination is 
contrary to the federal labor law.  We hold, therefore, that such a 
‘final’ decision on the merits of the employee’s grievance does not 
bar the employee from maintaining a breach-of-contract suit against 
his former employer.40 
Bingham was decided on December 21, 1976.  An amicus curiae 
brief was filed in the case by the International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America (UAW).  Williams begins his statement of facts: 
 Claimant Arlie K. Bingham was employed by American Screw 
Products Company from February 17, 1969 to November 17, 1969.  
He worked as a machine operator; his last wage-rate was $3.10 per 
hour. 
 Bingham testified that he left his Michigan employment because 
he had been unable to find adequate housing for his wife and four 
children in Michigan at a price which he could afford.  Bingham 
explained that while he was employed in Michigan he had searched 
continuously for a home in which his wife and [f]our children could 
live.  His family came to Michigan and lived with him for 
approximately one month; but the living quarters were inadequate.  
Because he was unable to find adequate living quarters within his 
 
38 Id. at 529 (footnote omitted). 
39 Id. at 529–30. 
40 Id. at 527. 
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means, his family was forced to return to Pineville, Kentucky, his 
original home.  After his family returned to Kentucky, Bingham 
made further efforts to find adequate living quarters, but his efforts 
proved futile.  He thereupon severed his Michigan employment, 
returning to Pineville, Kentucky, to join his family. . . . 
 On December 2, 1969, Bingham filed an interstate claim for 
unemployment benefits with the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
Division of Employment Service in Middlesboro, Kentucky.41 
Williams’s opinion opens: “This complex unemployment 
compensation case involves the interpretation of inter-related 
provisions of § 28 (‘Eligibility for Benefits’) and § 29 
(‘Disqualification from Benefits’) of the Michigan Employment 
Security Act.”42  There are two issues: first, “whether claimant, 
disqualified under the [A]ct for voluntarily terminating his 
employment, can requalify for benefits under the [A]ct outside the 
state of Michigan”;43 and, second, 
[w]hether claimant, after he moved home to Kentucky, was 
disqualified from receiving benefits for refusing the employer’s 
offer of his former job or whether claimant’s rejection of this 
reemployment offer was with ‘good cause’ because the offer was 
not an offer of ‘suitable work’ due to the unreasonable distance 
between his Kentucky residence and the Michigan job offer.44 
Williams continues: 
 At the outset, it is essential we bear in mind that our 
unemployment compensation act is part of a federal-state 
unemployment compensation system.  This federal-state system is 
grounded in the Federal Social Security Act, the Wagner-Peyser 
Act, and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, together with state 
laws enacted in conformity with the standards set forth by these 
federal laws.45 
Williams states as the court’s holding: 
 Because of the clear language in the Michigan Employment 
Security Act, the interstate agreements accompanying it, and the 
federal-state dimension integral to it, we hold that claimant 
Bingham, a Kentucky worker who left a Michigan job because he 
could not find adequate housing for his family at a price he could 
afford, returned to Kentucky, registered for work with the 
appropriate employment office there, diligently sought . . . work, 
 
41 Bingham v. Am. Screw Prods. Co., 248 N.W.2d 537, 539–40 (Mich. 1976). 
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but turned down a job offer from his former Michigan employer due 
to the distance from his Kentucky residence, [first,] requalified for 
benefits after serving the period of disqualification under the [A]ct, 
and[, second,] was not disqualified for refusing his former 
employer’s job offer because the offer was not an offer of ‘suitable 
work’ and was therefore rejected with ‘good cause’ due to the fact 
that the job was too far distant from his residence.46 
The professors who influenced me most in law school—Theodore 
St. Antoine, Joseph Sax, Yale Kamisar, Joseph Vining—taught what 
Karl Llewellyn had the insight to see in 1931, during the early years 
of the Great Depression, that, “[a]t best, [rules] set the framework for 
decision, and the bounds within which it is to move.  No less 
important,” Llewellyn said, “if there is any slightest doubt about the 
classification of the facts—though they be undisputed—the rule 
cannot decide the case; it is decided by the classifying.”  Legal rules 
and concepts develop out of factual situations, which “set the 
framework of approach to any legal problem-situation”; the legal 
rules or concepts that develop out of a factual situation “set the 
framework of thinking about, or even of perceiving, the problem.”47  
Llewellyn saw that any legal problem can be characterized as a field 
in the disciplinary sense of the word—as, first of all, a space 
comprising a number of interpretative possibilities available within 
the law’s set limits.  The way in which the facts are perceived and 
stated determines how the issues are framed. 
While I was working on Breish and Bingham, I was writing several 
poems, one of which, “Then,” opens the first part of my first book, 
Shouting at No One.  The poem reads: 
Joseph Joseph breathed slower 
as if that would stop 
the pain splitting his heart. 
He turned the ignition key 
to start the motor and leave 
Joseph’s Food Market to those 
who wanted what was left. 
Take the canned peaches, 
take the greens, the turnips, 
drink the damn whiskey 
spilled on the floor, 
he might have said. 
Though fire was eating half 
 
46 Id. at 548–49. 
47 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1934). 
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Detroit, Joseph could only think 
of how his father, 
with his bad legs, used to hunch 
over the cutting board 
alone in light particled 
with sawdust behind 
the meat counter, and he began 
to cry.  Had you been there 
you would have been thinking 
of the old Market’s wooden walls 
turned to ash or how Joseph’s whole arm 
had been shaking as he stooped 
to pick up an onion, 
and you would have been afraid. 
You wouldn’t have known 
that soon Joseph Joseph would stumble, 
his body paralyzed an instant 
from neck to groin. 
You would simply have shaken your head 
at the tenement named “Barbara” in flames 
or the Guardsman with an M-16 
looking in the window of Dave’s Playboy Barbershop, 
then closed your eyes 
and murmured, This can’t be. 
You wouldn’t have known 
it would take nine years 
before you realize the voice howling in you 
was born then.48 
II 
In 1983—two years after Nancy and I moved from Detroit to 
downtown Manhattan—I finished “Curriculum Vitae,” the title poem 
of my second book.  The poem’s closing lines read: 
Now years have passed since I came 
to the city of great fame. 
The same sun glows gray on two new rivers. 
Tears I want do not come. 
I remain many different people 
whose families populate half Detroit; 
I hate the racket of the machines, 
the oven’s heat, curse 
bossmen behind their backs. 
I hear the inmates’ collective murmur 
in the jail on Beaubien Street. 
 
48 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, Then, in SHOUTING AT NO ONE, at 3, 3–4 (1983), reprinted in 
LAWRENCE JOSEPH, CODES, PRECEPTS, BIASES, AND TABOOS: POEMS, 1973–1993, at 7, 
7–8 (2005). 
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I hear myself say, “What explains 
the Bank of Lebanon’s liquidity?” 
think, “I too will declare 
a doctrine upon whom the loss 
of language must fall regardless 
whether Wallace Stevens 
understood senior indebtedness 
in Greenwich village in 1906.” 
One woman hears me in my sleep 
plead the confusions of my dream. 
I frequent the Café Dante, earn 
my memories, repay my moods. 
I am as good as my heart. 
I am as good as the unemployed 
who wait in long lines for money.49 
From the summer of 1982 into the fall of 1983, while working as a 
litigation associate at the law firm of Shearman & Sterling located at 
53 Wall Street, a block from the New York Stock Exchange, I worked 
on a case that appears in the Federal Reports in 1984 under the title In 
re Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation.  The facts 
of the case can be found in an opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, written by Judge Arnold.  Flight 
Transportation, a Minnesota corporation, provided air-charter and 
other aviation services.  “William Rubin was [Flight Transportation’s] 
President, Chairman of the Board, and chief executive officer.”50  In 
June of 1982, Flight Transportation made two public offerings of 
securities, selling, on June 3, 715,000 common stock shares and, on 
June 4, 25,000 securities “units” consisting of a number of stock 
warrants and a debenture.  Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden 
and Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated were the lead 
underwriters.  On June 10 and June 14, Drexel and Moseley delivered 
full payment for both offerings through certified checks of over 
twenty-four million dollars to Flight Transportation.  Flight 
Transportation deposited these checks in a New Jersey bank account.  
“A few days after the deposit, on June 18, the SEC halted trading in 
[Flight Transportation] securities and commenced an action against 
[it], its subsidiaries, and Rubin in the United States District Court for 
the District of Minnesota, alleging that the defendants had violated”51 
 
49 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, Curriculum Vitae, in CURRICULUM VITAE, at 7, 8 (1988), 
reprinted in LAWRENCE JOSEPH, CODES, PRECEPTS, BIASES, AND TABOOS: POEMS, 1973–
1993, at 69, 70 (2005). 
50 In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 730 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1984). 
51 Id. 
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the federal securities laws, especially the antifraud provisions.  The 
district court appointed a receiver and entered a temporary restraining 
order.  The receiver transferred the remaining proceeds of the June 3 
and 4 offerings—some $22,700,000—from Flight Transportation’s 
New Jersey account to a segregated, interest-bearing “escrow fund” 
account in a Minneapolis bank.  On June 23, Drexel (represented by 
Cahill, Gordon & Reindel) and Moseley (represented by Shearman & 
Sterling),  
filed a class action in the same district court on behalf of themselves 
and all other persons who had purchased [Flight Transportation] 
securities pursuant to the June 3 and June 4 offerings.  In August 
1982, [Drexel and Moseley] moved for a constructive trust on the 
[e]scrow [f]und on behalf of members of the public to whom they 
had sold the June 1982 securities and sought a preliminary 
injunction against the distribution, commingling, withdrawal, or 
other disposition of the [fund].52 
Judge Arnold wrote, “During the following months, the litigation 
became increasingly complex.” 
During the summer and fall of 1982, I was finishing a law review 
article that I had begun in Detroit.  The Causation Issue in Workers’ 
Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a 
Perspective was published in the March 1983 issue of the Vanderbilt 
Law Review.  The article opens: “The causal relation between 
employment and a disabling mental or emotional injury presents one 
of the most complex issues in accidental injury and workers’ 
compensation law.”53  In the article’s introduction, I present its 
various purposes: first, “to explore comprehensively the technical and 
policy dimensions . . . in workers’ compensation mental disability 
cases”; second, “to clarify the distributive and jurisprudential 
considerations that courts and legislatures inevitably confront in their 
attempts to resolve the mental disability issue”; and 
a third, more general purpose . . . to provide a method of technical 
and policy analysis that applies not only to mental disabilities, but 
also to other disabling diseases of unknown etiology, including 
cardiovascular and back related disabilities.  These disabling 
 
52 Id. at 1130–31. 
53 Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers’ Compensation Mental Disability 
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 264 (1983) 
(footnote omitted).  This sentence was cited by the Supreme Court of Oregon in McGarrah 
v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp., a case in which the claimant sought workers’ 
compensation for “a mental disorder allegedly arising out of and in the scope of his 
employment.” 675 P.2d 159, 160, 161 (Or. 1983). 
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diseases contain essentially the same kind of technical, policy, 
administrative, and medical causation issues as . . . mental 
disabilities.54 
The article concludes with a “perspective,” a proposal for “a 
legislatively created compensation system designed and structured to 
deal specifically with most of the technical and policy considerations 
in mental disability cases and cases that concern disabling diseases of 
unknown etiology,” and provides “the structure as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of this proposed system.”55 
During that time, I was asked to contribute a poem to Ecstatic 
Occasions, Expedient Forms: 85 Leading Contemporary Poets Select 
and Comment on Their Poems.  Editor David Lehman explains in the 
book’s preface: “Each contributor was asked to provide a poem 
accompanied by a statement on the decisions that went into its 
making.”56  The poem that I submitted, “That’s All,” is in Curriculum 
Vitae.  It reads: 
I work and I remember.  I conceive 
a river of cracked hands above Manhattan. 
 
No spirit leaped with me in the womb. 
No prophet explains why Korean women 
 
thread Atomic Machinery’s machines 
behind massive, empty criminal tombs. 
 
Why do I make my fire my heart’s blood, 
two or three ideas thought through 
 
to their conclusions, make my air 
dirty the rain around towers of iron, 
 
a brown moon, the whole world? 
My power becomes my sorrow. 
 
54 Joseph, supra note 53, at 268–69. 
55 Id. at 269.  Justice Jones, writing for the Supreme Court of Oregon in McGarrah—
again citing the article—noted that: 
A legislature may wish to consider the scholarly work and suggestion for a 
“worker’s disease protection system” which would substantially and structurally 
reform the present methods of compensation for mental disorders and resulting 
disabilities. 
McGarrah, 675 P.2d at 160.  “This interesting proposal is set forth by attorney Lawrence 
Joseph of the New York Bar in his challenging law review article . . . .”  Id. at 160 n.5. 
56 ECSTATIC OCCASIONS, EXPEDIENT FORMS: 85 LEADING CONTEMPORARY POETS 
SELECT AND COMMENT ON THEIR POEMS, at xi (David Lehman ed., 2d ed. 1996) 
[hereinafter ECSTATIC OCCASIONS]. 
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Truth?  My lies are sometimes true. 
Firsthand, I now see the God 
 
whose witness is revealed in tongues 
before the Exchange on Broad Street 
 
and the transfer of 2,675,000,000 dollars 
by tender offer are acts of the mind, 
 
and the calculated truths of First 
National City Bank.  Too often 
 
I think about third cousins in the Shouf. 
I also often think about the fact that 
 
in 1926, after Céline visited 
the Ford Rouge foundry and wrote 
 
his treatise on the use of physically 
inferior production line workers, 
 
an officially categorized “displaced person” 
tied a handkerchief around his face 
 
to breathe the smells and the heat 
in a manner so as not to destroy 
 
his lungs and brain for four years 
until he was laid off. I don’t 
 
meditate on hope and despair. 
I don’t deny the court that rules 
 
my race is Jewish or Abyssinian. 
In good times I transform myself 
 
into the sun’s great weight, in bad times 
I make myself like smoke on flat wastes. 
 
I don’t know why I choose who I am: 
I work and I remember, that’s all.57 
My statement about the poem reads: 
 I began “That’s All” in late 1982, two and a half years after I 
moved to New York City from Detroit.  I wanted to write a poem 
that incorporated various aspects of both cities and of the Shouf 
 
57 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, That’s All, in CURRICULUM VITAE 34, 34–35 (1988), reprinted 
in ECSTATIC OCCASIONS, supra note 56, at 111, 111–12. 
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mountains in Lebanon (from which my grandfather emigrated, and 
which was immersed at the time in fierce warfare).  I wanted to 
make emblematic images of Detroit, New York and Lebanon: 
Detroit, as an expression of labor; New York City, as an expression 
of finance capital; Lebanon, as an expression of religious violence.  
I also wanted to create a person—the I of the poem—who reacted 
to and was part of these worlds.58 
On January 26, 1990, seven or so years later, I wrote in my journal: 
“James Schuyler: his secret—he contains Williams, Moore, Stevens, 
Bishop, and several million aesthetic megawatts of the French avant-
garde.  A very smart talker.”  That following summer, I was asked by 
the editor of Poetry East to write on a book of poems that was 
important to me.  My essay, The Morning of the Poem, was written 
shortly after James Schuyler died on April 12, 1991.  It appeared in 
Poetry East’s Fall 1992 Praises issue.  I wrote: 
Although every poem he writes is spoken by a particular, subjective 
self, his “I” is, at the same time, revealed as consubstantial and 
coextensive with the poem itself.  The writing subject is not only 
dependent on language, but is also part of it, placed in the position 
of questioning its own, and its language’s, status and function.  The 
language of a Schuyler poem exists on (at least) two separate yet 
overlapping planes: one where language is used as a medium of 
communicating meaning; the other, an aesthetic plane, where the 
language of the poem embodying the speaker-self possesses an 
autonomous value. . . . Schuyler’s poetry, like collage, demonstrates 
a sharp demarcation between the imagination and actual, everyday 
life.  The real world is engulfed in an aesthetic venture.59 
In early 1991, I was also asked to write a comment on the first Gulf 
War for the Hungry Mind Review.  In War Afterthoughts, I began: 
“Make no mistake about it: the Iraqi military state is barbarous, an 
affront to the dignity and inviolability of Arab life.”60  I went on: 
But, almost immediately after the Gulf War began on August 2, 
1990, the executive of the United States utilized his enormous war 
powers to amass over a half-million American troops, as well as 
hundreds of billions of dollars of armaments, within eight weeks.  
War, on America’s part, was inevitably made.  Socially, the 
executive showed how efficiently the United States could 
collectivize militarily (although in other social realms—wealth 
distribution, medical care, sustenance for the aged, poor, and infirm, 
 
58 ECSTATIC OCCASIONS, supra note 56, at 112. 
59 Lawrence Joseph, The Morning of the Poem, POETRY EAST, Fall 1992, at 157, 157–
58. 
60 Lawrence Joseph, War Afterthoughts, HUNGRY MIND REV., Summer 1991, at 27, 27. 
 2009] Being in the Language of Poetry 923 
labor—the abject failure of the state to collectivize its powers 
remains manifest).61 
The President has historically 
reaffirmed that these United States have been, effectively, in a state 
of war since the late 1930s.  After over a half-century, the war state 
so profoundly permeates the American economy and consciousness 
that ours has become a society in which ninety percent of its 
populace appears to have no moral problems with elaborately 
abstract (and media controlled) justifications for state-sanctioned 
violence.  As for the moral implications of the violence committed 
by our armed forces in excess of that needed to dislodge the Iraqi 
army from Kuwait, and the disbalance between the amount of 
violence our armed forces unleashed and the values (political and 
moral) we purported to uphold—well, take a look, for example, at a 
recent cover of Newsweek.  Without any irony, the lead domestic 
story, “Violence: Is It Mainstream?,” is scripted beneath another 
headline, “Apocalypse in Iraq.”  Neither article imagines there 
might be possible connections with the other. 
 The question of how much power our constitutional democracy 
should provide its executive and armed forces is not only one of the 
most crucial domestic political issues—it is among our most 
necessary moral issues, too.62 
The April 20, 1992, issue of the Nation includes an essay of mine 
on Adrienne Rich’s book of poems An Atlas of the Difficult World.  I 
wrote: 
Rich looks at herself and her subject matter hard, pushing out the 
complexities of human behavior through an “I” who is essentially 
functional, although at the same time personal and social.  For Rich, 
the poet inside a wrecked society must will an imagined common 
language to get to human love, which is for her the central subject 
of any personal or social order.  A poetry of ideological 
commitment must enter the heart and mind, become as real as one’s 
body, as vital as life itself—that’s what makes it poetry.63 
During the summer of 1992, I wrote several poems that appear in 
my third book, Before Our Eyes.  One poem, “Under a Spell,” opens 
with these lines: 
Now the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank 
doesn’t know how much more he can take 
while my thoughts wander outside me and can’t be grasped— 




63 Lawrence Joseph, The Real Thing, 254 NATION 531, 533 (Apr. 20, 1992) (book 
review). 
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on Death Row whose brain cells will reach 
the point of boiling water during electrocution 
receive blessings through cable television 
and presidents and commissars devise 
international housecleanings 
history won’t recognize for years, 
the precedence of language and image preoccupies me too 
under the influence of a spell.64 
On February 12, 2009, I gave a talk in Chicago on Wallace 
Stevens.  I said: 
Most poets, even most critics, as well as the continuously growing 
readership of Stevens’s poetry, think and speak of Stevens as a poet 
who also underwrote insurance.  But Stevens had nothing to do with 
underwriting insurance of any kind, nor was he involved in any of 
Hartford’s business decisions.  Stevens was a lawyer, Hartford’s in-
house counsel for handling surety bond claims.  He was, in fact, a 
first-rate lawyer, considered, as one colleague put it, to be “the dean 
of surety-claims-men in the whole country.”65 
In “The Irrational Element in Poetry,” a talk that he presented at 
Harvard in 1936, Stevens asks rhetorically: “Why does one write 
poetry?”  “[B]ecause,” he answers, “one is impelled to do so by 
personal sensibility.”  Stevens says, 
A poet writes poetry because he is a poet; and he is not a poet 
because he is a poet but because of his personal sensibility.  What 
gives a man his personal sensibility I don’t know and it does not 
matter because no one knows.  Poets continue to be born not     
made . . . .66 
On July 29, 1942—just months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor 
by the Japanese—Stevens writes in a letter to Harvey Breit: 
[O]ne is not a lawyer one minute and a poet the next.  You said in 
your first letter something about a point at which I turned from 
being a lawyer to writing poetry.  There never was any such point.  I 
have always been intensely interested in poetry . . . . 
 No one could be more earnest about anything than I am about 
poetry, but this is not due to any event or exercise of will; it is a 
 
64 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, Under a Spell, in BEFORE OUR EYES 18, 18 (1993), reprinted in 
LAWRENCE JOSEPH, CODES, PRECEPTS, BIASES, AND TABOOS: POEMS, 1973–1993, at 
135, 135 (2005). 
65 Lawrence Joseph, The Poet and the Lawyer: The Example of Wallace Stevens, 
Address at the 2009 Association of Writers and Writing Programs Conference, Chi., Ill. 
(Feb. 12, 2009) (transcript on file with author). 
66 Wallace Stevens, The Irrational Element in Poetry, Address at Harvard University 
(1936), in OPUS POSTHUMOUS 224, 224, 227 (Milton J. Bates ed., Vintage Books 1990) 
(1957). 
 2009] Being in the Language of Poetry 925 
natural development of an interest that always existed.  Moreover, I 
don’t have a separate mind for legal work and another for writing 
poetry.  I do each with my whole mind, just as you do everything 
that you do with your whole mind.67 
In a letter to Breit sent about a week later, Stevens writes: 
“[L]awyers very often make use of their particular faculties to satisfy 
their particular desires.”  In an untitled prose piece included at the end 
of Stevens’s book of poems Parts of a World, which was published in 
September 1942, Stevens writes: “The poetry of a work of the 
imagination constantly illustrates the fundamental and endless 
struggle with fact.”68 
On Sunday, January 25, 2009, in an article in the New York Times, 
Exposed to Solvent, Worker Faces Hurdles, Felicity Barringer writes: 
When the University of Kentucky published new research in 2008 
suggesting that exposure to a common industrial solvent might 
increase the risk for Parkinson’s disease, the moment was a source 
of satisfaction to Ed Abney, a [fifty-three]-year-old former tool-
and-die worker. . . . now sidelined by Parkinson’s [who] had spent 
more than two decades up to his elbows in a drum of the solvent, 
trichloroethylene, while he cleaned metal piping at a now-shuttered 
Dresser Industries plant here.69 
The University of Kentucky study, according to Barringer, 
had focused on [Abney] and his factory co-workers who worked 
near the same 55-gallon drum of the vaguely sweet-smelling 
chemical.  It found that 27 workers had either the anxiety, tremors, 
rigidity or other symptoms associated with Parkinson’s, or had 
motor skills that were significantly impaired, compared with a 
healthy peer group.  The study, Mr. Abney thought, [provided] the 
scientific evidence he needed to claim worker’s compensation 
benefits.70 
“He was wrong,” Barringer writes. 
The medical researchers would not sign the form attesting that Mr. 
Abney’s disease was linked to his work. 
 Individuals like Mr. Abney are caught between the conflicting 
imperatives of science and law—and there is a huge gap between 
what researchers are discovering about environmental contaminants 
and what they can prove about their impact on disease.  The gap has 
 
67 Letter from Wallace Stevens to Harvey Breit (July 29, 1942), in LETTERS OF 
WALLACE STEVENS 413, 413–14 (Holly Stevens ed., 1966). 
68 WALLACE STEVENS, PARTS OF A WORLD 183 (1942). 
69 Felicity Barringer, Exposed to Solvent, Worker Faces Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2009, at A16. 
70 Id. 
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ensured that only a tiny fraction of worker’s compensation 
payments are received by those who were exposed to harmful 
substances at work.71 
In the April 2009 issue of Harper’s, in an article, Infinite Debt: 
How Unlimited Interest Rates Destroyed the Economy, Chicago labor 
lawyer Thomas Geoghegan writes: 
 Some people still think our financial collapse was the result of a 
technical glitch—a failure, say, to regulate derivatives or hedge 
funds. . . . 
 In fact, no amount of New Deal regulation or SEC-watching 
could have stopped what happened. . . . The problem was not that 
we “deregulated the New Deal” but that we deregulated a much 
older, even ancient, set of laws. 
 First, we removed the possibility of creating real, binding 
contracts by allowing employers to bust the unions that had been 
entering into these agreements for millions of people.  Second, we 
allowed those same employers to cancel existing contracts, virtually 
at will, by transferring liability from one corporate shell to another, 
or letting a subsidiary go into Chapter 11 and then moving to 
“cancel” the contract rights, including lifetime health benefits and 
pensions. . . . 
 And then we dismantled the most ancient of human laws, the 
law against usury, which had existed in some form in every 
civilization from the time of the Babylonian Empire to the end of 
Jimmy Carter’s term . . . . That’s when we found out what happens 
when an advanced industrial economy tries to function with no cap 
at all on interest rates. 
 Here’s what happens: the financial sector bloats up.  With no 
law capping interest, the evil is not only that banks prey on the poor 
(they have always done so) but that capital gushes out of 
manufacturing and into banking. . . . What is history, really, but a 
turf war between manufacturing, labor, and the banks?72 
On September 24, 2008, I wrote in my journal: 
 Locating, historically, the time of the financial collapse               
. . . Friday, September 12 . . . Saturday, Sunday, Monday—
September 13, 14, 15.  The Times, in Monday the 15th’s paper: “On 
Sunday, as the heads of major Wall Street banks huddled for a third 
day of emergency meetings at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York . . . .”  No one connects the fact that these meetings took place 
two blocks from the site of the World Trade Center, seven years and 
. . . one . . . two . . . three . . . four days after the suicide bombings of 
the World Trade Center Towers . . . four, five blocks from our 
apartment . . . right over here again, in our neighborhood. 
 
71 Id. 
72 Thomas Geoghegan, Infinite Debt: How Unlimited Interest Rates Destroyed the 
Economy, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2009, at 31, 32. 
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This is my poem “The Game Changed,” written in 2003, which 
appears in my fourth book, Into It: 
The phantasmic imperium is set in a chronic 
state of hypnotic fixity.  I have absolutely 
no idea what the fuck you’re talking about 
was his reply, and he wasn’t laughing, 
either, one of the most repellent human beings 
I’ve ever known, his presence a gross and slippery 
lie, a piece of chemically pure evil.  A lawyer— 
although the type’s not exclusive to lawyers. 
A lot of different minds touch, and have touched, 
the blood money in the dummy account 
in an offshore bank, washed clean, free to be 
transferred into a hedge fund or a foreign 
brokerage account, at least half a trillion 
ending up in the United States, with more to come. 
I believe I told you I’m a lawyer.  Which has had 
little or no effect on a certain respect 
I have for occurrences that suggest laws 
of necessity.  I too am thinking of it 
as a journey—the journey with conversations 
otherwise known as the Divina Commedia 
is how Osip Mandelstam characterized Dante’s poem. 
Lebanon?  I hear the Maronite Patriarch 
dares the Syrians to kill him, no word 
from my grandfather’s side of the family 
in the Shouf.  “There are circles here”— 
to quote the professor of international 
relations and anthropology—“Vietnam, Lebanon, 
and Iraq . . . Hanoi, Beirut, and Baghdad.” 
The beggar in Rome is the beggar in Istanbul, 
the blind beggar is playing saxophone, 
his legs covered with a zebra-striped blanket, 
the woman beside him holding an aluminum cup, 
beside them, out of a shopping bag, the eyes 
of a small, sick dog.  I’m no pseudoaesthete. 
It’s a physical thing.  An enthusiasm, 
a transport.  The melancholy is ancient. 
The intent is to make a large, serious 
portrait of my time.  The sun on the market 
near Bowling Green, something red, something 
purple, bunches of roses and lilacs.  A local 
issue for those of us in the neighborhood. 
Not to know what it is you’re breathing 
in a week when Black Hawk helicopters resume 
patrolling the harbor.  Two young men 
blow themselves up attaching explosives 
on the back of a cat.  An insurgency: 
commandos are employed, capital is manipulated 
to secure the oil of the Asian Republics. 
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I was walking in the Forties when I saw it— 
a billboard with a background of brilliant 
blue sky, with writing on it in soft-edged, 
irregularly spaced, airy-white letters 
already drifting off into the air, as if they’d 
been sky-written—“The World Really Does 
Revolve Around You.”  The taxi driver rushes 
to reach his family before the camp is closed— 
“There is no way I will leave, there is no way— 
they will have to kill us, and, even if 
they kill every one of us, we won’t leave.”  Sweat 
dripping from her brow, she picks up the shattered, 
charred bones.  She works for the Commission 
on Missing Persons.  “First they kill them,” 
she says, “then they burn them, then they cover them 
with dead babies . . .”  Neither impenetrable opacity 
nor absolute transparency.  I know what I’m after. 
The entire poem is finished in my head.  No, 
I mean the entire poem.  The color, the graphic 
parts, the placement of solid bodies in space, 
gradations of light and dark, the arrangements 
of pictorial elements on a single plane 
without a loss of depth . . . This habit of wishing— 
as if one’s mother and father lay in one’s heart, 
and wished as they had always wished—that voice, 
one of the great voices, worth listening to. 
A continuity in which everything is transition. 
To repeat it because it’s worth repeating.  Immanence— 
an immanence and a happiness.  Yes, exquisite— 
an exquisite dream.  The mind on fire 
possessed by what is desired—the game changed.73 
III 
On January 4, 1990, I wrote in my journal: “Ideas for titles of 
poems: ‘The Constant and Endless Struggle with Fact’                         
. . .‘Admissions Against Interest.’”  On August 22, 1990, I wrote: 
“working on ‘Admissions Against Interest’—ready to write it.” 
An admission against interest is an admission to the truth of a fact 
by a person, although the admission is against his or her personal or 
economic interests.  It is an exception to the hearsay rule and is 
allowed into evidence on the theory that the lack of incentive to make 
a damaging statement is an indication of the statement’s reliability.74 
 
73 Lawrence Joseph, The Game Changed, in INTO IT, 63, 63–65 (2005) (omission in 
original). 
74 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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My poem “Admissions Against Interest” is in Before Our Eyes.  It 
is in four parts.  Part II in its entirety reads: 
Now, what type of animal asks after facts? 
—so I’m a lawyer.  Maybe charming, 
 
direct yet as circumspect as any other lawyer 
going on about concrete forces of civil 
 
society substantially beyond anyone’s grasp 
and about money.  Things like “you too 
 
may be silenced the way powerful 
corporations silence, contractually” 
 
attract my attention.  The issue’s 
bifurcated.  “Why divide the dead?” 
 
the Foreign Minister asks, “what’s one life 
when you’ve lost twenty million?” 
 
And if what has happened during my life 
had been otherwise could I say 
 
I would have seen it much differently? 
Authority?  Out of deeper strata 
 
illuminations.  A lot of substance 
chooses you.  And it’s no one’s business 
 
judging the secrets each of us needs: 
I don’t know what I’d do without my Double.75 
IV 
So it is—“The intent is to make a large, serious portrait of my 
time.”  Like this it is—being in the language of poetry, being in the 
language of law . . . 
 
75 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, Admissions Against Interest, in BEFORE OUR EYES 10, 12–13 
(1993), reprinted in LAWRENCE JOSEPH, CODES, PRECEPTS, BIASES, AND TABOOS: 
POEMS, 1973–1993, at 131, 132 (2005). 
 930 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 905 
 
